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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the extent of and causes of change
in corporate focus in the 1980s.

We find that most of the

2,500 largest U.S. firms became more specialized in the
1980s.

The greatest change in focus took place through the

exit of diversified firms which were replaced by smaller,
less diversified, and more often private entrants.

While

most firms focused, the largest firms in the economy
continued their historical trend towards greater diversification during the 1980s.

As a consequence, the fraction of

assets and revenues in the economy controlled by highly
diversified firms fell only slightly.

While the results do

not support most explanations for corporate refocusing, we
find that firms with strong core market positions and high
R & D expenditures tended to diversify while other firms
refocused.

This suggests that refocusing during the 1980s

was primarily a response to changing competitive forces in
the U.S. economy.
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1. Introduction
An important development in the 1980s was the apparent reversal of a historical trend of

diversification as many firms divested lines of business, or were broken up following hostile
takeovers and leveraged buyouts. I For this reason, corporate de-diversification (or "refocusing")
has been widely cited as a key motive for the high volume of corporate restructming activity during
the 1980s.2 Yet, this shift towards corporate refocusing in the 1980s remains a puzzle. Why
should corporate behavior have changed so dramatically, reversing diversification decisions
previously endorsed by shareholders? 3 This paper attempts to answer this question in two ways.
First, we document the extent of corporate refocusing during the 1980s among firms in the U.S.
economy and show how such changes depend on size, initial diversification, and whether a firm is
public or private. Second, we test the principal explanations which have been given for corporate
refocusing. These are:
(i)

Reduction of agency costs. Refocusing during the 1980s may have reversed prior acquisition.
diversification and expansion decisions carried out by non-value-maximizing managers
[Jensen (1986, 1991), Bicksler and Chen (1991)].

(ii) Reduction of internal capital market efficiency. Refocusing may have reduced the scope of
firms' internal capital markets, as continuing innovation in fmancial markets and the

reinvigorated market for corporate control during the 1980s reduced their advantage in
allocating capital among lines of business relative to external cap4al markets [Bhide (1990)].
(iii) Response to antitrust relaxation. Relaxed antitrust enforcement in the 1980s may have
increased the comparative value of horizontal market expansion relative to diversification,
leading firms to expand core businesses and shed peripheral businesses with small market
shares [Shleifer and Vishny (1991)].

(iv) Reduction of misvaluation. Refocusing may have been intended to reduce information
asymmetries between shareholders and managers by simplifying the valuation problems of
complex diversified firms and allowing hidden asset values to be realized [Stein (1989),
LeBaron and Speidell (1987)].
These explanations rely on the benefits of refocusing. However, there are also costs of
refocusing. For example, diversification may yield economies of scope in valuable fum-specific
assets such as knowledge, reputation and proprietary technology which would be lost if
1 For details see Bhagat. Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Hoskisson and Johnson (1991), Kaplan and Weisbacb {1992),
Comment and Jarrell (1992), Lichtenberg (1992), and Liebeskind, Wiersema and Hansen (1992).
2 See, for example, Jensen (1991), Shleifez and Visbny (1991), and Bbide (1990).
3 Matsusaka {1990) shows that diversifying acquisitions during the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and
1970s increased fmn value on avenge.
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diversification is reversed [Teece (1980)]. Diversified fliiDS may also be able to allocate capital
more efficiently than external capital markets [Williamson (1975)]. While the factors which
influence the costs and benefits of diversification strategies have been extensively analyzed, little is
known about the empirical determinants of change in corporate diversification.4 Diversification
decisions, however, may be among the most important that managers make: the costs of mistaken
diversification are high and can lead to increased risk of takeover [Mitchell and Lehn ( 1990),
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Opler (1992)].
Two previous studies have examined corporate refocusing in the 1980s using COMPUSTAT
business segment data. Uchtenberg (1992) fmds that public firms reponed fewer 4-digit lines of
business as the 1980s progressed; he also fmds that more focused fliiDS had higher total factor
productivity. Comment and Jarrell (1992) also find that public firms became more specialized and
reponed fewer 4-digit operating segments as the 1980s progressed. Their analysis proceeds to
show that refocusing increased market value and that several sources of economies of scope often
are not realized by diversified firms. 5
Our analysis uses different data than these previous studies. This data was compiled from

TRINET Inc.'s Large Establishment Database, a data source which is more detailed than the
COMPUSTAT segment data, is less prone to self-reporting biases, and covers both public and
private firms. The TRINET data therefore offers a more complete record of corporate refocusing
among large firms during the 1980s.
In addition, because diversification is a complex phenomenon, the extent of refocusing
measured in different studies may depend on the measures used and the level of industry
aggregation followed. We use the following four measures of diversification: (1) specialization

4 Rumelt (1986. p. viii) comments: "'We still do not really understand what triggers changes in diversification
strategy. Why do some finns diversify while others retrench in the face of adversity?" One study which examines
changes in diversification is Hill and Hansen (1991). They find that diversification in pharmaceutical firms is
detennined by market saturation in co-e businesses. di1Ierences in managezial incentives. and ownership structure.
Another study by Gort. Grabowski and McGuckin (1985) shows that increases in diversification among 191 finns
in the 1%7-71 period were negatively relaled to prior diversiflCation and to productivity growth in the finn's core
industy.
5 Lang and Stulz (1992) also study the relation between focus and market value in the 1980s. They find a
U-shaped relation between diversification and Tobin's q.
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(the fraction of a firm's total employees in its largest 4-d.igit SIC code, also called the "maximum
proportion"); (2) relatedness (the fraction of a firm's total employees in its largest 2-digit SIC
code); (3) 4-digit span (the number of 4-digit SIC code industries in which the firm is active); and
(4) 2-digit span. 6 We find that both specialization and relatedness increased among the largest
U.S. fums during the 1980s, but that 4-digit span increased Therefore, the representative large
firm in the U.S. economy generated more sales in its core business areas in 1989 than in 1981, but
entered more lines of business. We also find that the very largest fums in the economy became

less specialized in the 1980s, continuing their trend of increasing diversification documented by
Gort (1962), Rumelt (1986) and Spruill (1982).
We fmd little support for any of the four explanations for corporate refocusing examined.
First, we find that Tobin's q is an insignificant predictor of change in corporate focus in the 1980s.
This fmding is inconsistent with the agency cost explanation for corporate refocusing which
predicts that poorly performing fums (those with low q's) will be the most likely to refocus.
However, we find a strong trend of mean reversion in diversification during the 1980s, showing
that more highly diversified firms refocused the most during the 1980s, regardless of their
performance. Second, we find no evidence to support the internal capital market inefficiency
explanation for corporate refocusing: the largest fums in the economy continued to expand and
diversify during the 1980s. Third, we fmd little support for the argument that changes in focus
during the 1980s were a result of relaxed antitrust policy. Firms with the highest core business
market shares in 1981 continued to diversify dming the 1980s, despite new opporn.mities to
increase their core business market shares through horizontal acquisitions. Moreover, large firms
were most active in adding businesses to periphery rather than core business areas. Finally, we
find no evidence that misvaluation influenced refocusing. Firms which had high levels of analyst
forecast disagreement in 1980 were less likely, not more likely, to refocus.
6 These measures are based on Rumelt's (1986) classification of corporate strategies and are used widely in research
on diversification. See, for example, Hill and Snell (1988) and Comment and Jarrell (1992). In an earlier version
of the paper we also examined changes in the Entropy and Herfindahl measures of corporate focus but found that our
results did not change with these measures. This is not surprising since these measures were highly correlated with
the specialization and relatedness ratios used here.
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Of course, our conclusions are only as strong as the proxies for the theories we test It is

possible that other proxy variables may provide more suppon for one or more of these
explanations for refocusing. This proviso notwithstanding, our findings suggest that corporate
refocusing during the 1980s was a response to changes in the competitive environment First, we
find that firms with smaller core business market shares in 1981 refocused more than firms with
larger core market shares. Second, we find that firms with high levels of R&D expenditure were
more likely to diversify, suggesting that firms which owned valuable idiosyncratic assets were not
subject to pressures to refocus. Overall, therefore, we find that large firms with large core market
shares and high R&D levels expanded and diversified, while smaller firms with small core market
positions and few idiosyncratic assets retrenched.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
arguments regarding the benefits and costs of corporate focus in order to establish hypotheses to
explain cross-sectional variation in refocusing in the 1980s. Section 3 describes the data and
measures of focus .used in this study. Section 4 documents the extent of corporate refocusing
among the largest 2,500 firms in the U.S. economy during the 1980s. Section 5 presents
longitudinal regression analyses of the determinants of corporate refocusing in public firms.
Section 6 summarizes and discusses the results.

2.

The Benefits and Costs of Corporate Refocusing

2.1 Benefits of Refocusing
Four explanations have been provided for the corporate refocusing phenomenon which point
to the value created by reducing the costs of diversification. These explanations are:

(i) Reduction of agency costs. Poor incentive structures may cause managers in public
corporations to over-invest in diverSifying expansion, reducing the value of the firm. [See, for
example, Marris (1964), Amihud and Lev (1981), Jensen (1986)]. Managerially-motivated
diversification may reduce finn value by permitting managers to cross-subsidize unprofitable lines
of business [Bhide (1990)]. Managers may also overpay for takeover targets [Roll (1986), Morek,
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Shleifer and Vishny (1990)]. Refocusing may have increased during the 1980s, and not before, as
the extent of the extent of agency costs associated with diversification was revealed. Pressure to
refocus may also have intensified during the 1980s because the rise in real interest rates increased
the costs of cross-subsidization, and because financial innovations reduced the costs of launching a
hostile takeover? The agency theory explanation for refocusing suggests that private corporations~
where managers typically own more equity, should be less likely to have undertaken wasteful
diversification in the 1960s and 1970s than managers in public firms (Jensen 1991).
Consequently, privately held firms should have had less need to refocus during the 1980s than
public firms. We investigate this issue in Section 4. The agency explanation of refocusing also
predicts that firms which have a low Tobin's q should refocus since low Tobin's q signifies low
expected cash flows relative to invested assets, an indicator of poor expected finn performance and
agency conflict [see Lang and Litzenberger (1989)]. We investigate this issue in Section 5.

(ii) Reduction of internal capital market inefficiency. A second explanation for refocusing is
that external governance of capital allocation among lines of business became more efficient relative
to internal capital market governance in the 1980s. First, increasing shareholder activism and
changes in legal precedent regarding shareholders' rights may have increased the efficiency of
governance of capital allocation decisions by shareholders relative to corporate headquarters [Bhide
(1990), Jensen (1991)]. Second, innovations in external fmancial markets (e.g. the venture capital
market) may have made market governance of some capital reallocation decisions more efficient.
Both of these considerations suggest that breaking up internal capital markets may have created
value during the 1980s. In Section 4 we test this explanation for refocusing by examining change
in the scope of internal capital markets (measured in terms of revenues) of more focused firms
during the 1980s. In Section 5 we analyze the relationship between corporate refocusing and firm
fixed assets in 1981. According to the internal capital market inefficiency explanation for
refocusing, firms with greater fixed asset bases should be more liable to refocus than other firms
7 Comment and Jarrell (1992) present a related story that refocusing was the result of reduced retmns from
holding assets for future sale attributable to an active market for corp<nte assets.
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since they have historically higher levels of capital investment with the resulting potential for capital
misallocation.

(iii) Relaxation of antitrust el(orcement. During the 1980s, the enforcement of anti-trust
legislation was relaxed, giving many firms with large market shares a new option to undertake
horizontal market expansion through merger [Shleifer and Vishny (1991)]. Consequently, some
firms may have found it relatively more profitable to focus by expanding lines of business in which

they held large market shares at the beginning of the decade than to diversify. We test this
explanation by investigating whether firms with the highest core market shares in 1981 were more
likely to refocus, since these firms should have had the most to gain from the relaxation of antitrust
regulation.

(iv) Reduction in market misvaluarion. Diversified firms may be more subject to misvaluation
by the market than focused firms because of the difficulty of valuing synergies between lines of
business. Evidence offered by LeBaron and Speidell (1987) is consistent with this claim.
Misvaluation of diversified firms may have intensified shareholder pressure to refocus during the
1980s. In Section 5 we test this explanation for refocusing using disagreement among analysts'
earnings forecasts as a proxy for misvaluation. The less analysts agree over future finn
performance, the less likely it is that the firm is being valued accurately and the greater pressure to
·refocus. If equity market misvaluation were the primary cause of refocusing then we would also
expect to see more focusing in public than in private firms.

2.2 The Costs of Refocusing
The four explanations outlined above suggest that refocusing will increase firm value because
the costs of diversification outweigh its benefits. However, other arguments suggest that
diversification in the 1980s may have brought significant benefits. We categorize these arguments
into two groups:

(i) Changing economies of scope. Diversified fmns may be able to exploit economies of
scope in assets which are firm-specific by using them to produce a number of different products
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[Teece (1980)]. These assets may be tangible, such as production and distribution facilities, or
intangible, such as proprietary know-how or reputational capital. In either case, synergistic or
"related" diversification should increase the value of the firm. Gort (1962), Hill and Hansen
(1991) and others have shown that diversifying investment tends to be concentrated in technologyintensive industries. The value of economies of scope may have during the 1980s due to increased
technological innovation. It is also possible that product market globalization during the 1980s
created new sources of economies of scope for diversified firms. ·we examine the role of
economies of scope in Section 4 of this paper by investigating whether related diversification
increased or decreased during the 1980s. In Section 5 we investigate whether idiosyncratic and
extensible assets are associated with increases in diversification, using R&D expenditures as a
proxy for such assets.
(ii)

Increases in internal capital market efficiency. Internal capital markets may be more

efficient than external capital markets, despite their costs. Williamson (1975) argues that resource
allocation is more efficient in internal capital markets because there is less information asymmetry
between corporate headquarters and divisional managers than there is between shareholders and
managers. Thus, we entertain the hypothesis that the relative efficiency of internal capital markets
increased in the 1980s. This is the opposite of the relative capital market inefficiency hypothesis
discussed earlier. Internal capital market efficiency may have increased in the 1980s as firms
changed their procedures for making divisional investments or improved the accuracy of internal
performance measurement In certain cases, organizational innovations may have reduced crosssubsidization problems (e.g. legal "Chinese Walls" between divisions as in National Intergroup
and USX).s

8The 1980s also saw the rise of leveraged buyout specialist organizations such as Kohlbcrg, Kravis and
Roberts which perfonned many of the functioos of the headquarters of a multi-divisional finn while
disallowing cross-subsidization.
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3.

Data, Sample and Measures

3.1 Sample
Our base sample includes 3,609 public and private U.S. corporations which were among the

2,500 largest employers 1981 and/or 1989. This sample consists of surviving, exiting and
entering firms. Surviving fmns are defined as those which were independent legal entities in 1981
(that is, not a subsidiary fum of another corporation nor in Chapter 11) and remained independent
until 1989. Firms among the largest 2,500 independent employers in 1981 were also classified as
surviving firms even if they were not among the top 2,500 in 1989. Firms which were
independent in 1981 but which did not survive unti11989 are defined as exiting firms. Entering
firms are defined as independent fmns which were not among the largest 2,500 employers in
1981, but had become so by 1989. These firms may have existed in 1981, or been started up
between 1981 and 1989.

32Data
Financial data for this study were collected from the COMPUSTAT PSI', Full Coverage and

Research files. These data describe firm R&D, capital expenditures, operating income, sales, and
asset base. We obtained data on analysts' earnings-forecast disagreement from the 1/BIE/S Inc.
database. Data on firm diversification and industry market share are estimated from lRINET
Inc.'s Large Establishment Database (hereafter referred to as TRINET). Details of these measures
are given in Section 3.3 and Appendix A. TRINET provides information on establishments (i.e.
plants, administrative offices or other separate geographic business locations) that employ 20 or
more persons in United States. 1RINET classifies each establishment according to a primary fourdigit SIC code and provides information on the establishment's number of employees and
estimated sales in cUITent dollars. Establishment-level data can be aggregated to the company level
using parent company codes. 1RINET Inc. updates its database continually by direct surveys,
telephone calls to establishments, and reference to corporate financial data and news items; new
versions of the Large Establishment Database are issued on tape biannually for research purposes.
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A particularly useful feature of TRINET is that it provides information on establishments owned by
private firms as well as information on establishments owned by public firms; this allows us to
compare changes in focus in public firms with changes in focus in similar private firms.
The TRINET data have several advantages over the COMPUSTAT industry segment data
used in some earlier studies. First, COMPUSTAT data on diversification are collected at the
"industry segment" level by firms according to Rule 14 of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB 14). Each industry segment is then assigned one four-digit SIC code. This
procedure tends to lump information from many different types of corporate activities together
given that industry segments often comprise both diversified and vertically integrated activities in
large firms. TRINET data are collected at the establishment level so that the activities of the firm
are disaggregated in much greater detail. Second, there is no standardization in the assignment of
four-digit SIC codes to industry segments by COMPUSTAT. The industry segment data in
COMPUSTAT are reported by the managers of each firm, allowing them to conceal diversification
by combining activities into one segment.9 In contrast, TRINET uses SIC codes assigned by the
Bureau of the Census to operating establishments. Third, according toFASB 14 COMPUSTAT
data are only reponed for industry segments that account for 10 percent or more of final sales. The
effect of this ruling is to omit secondary and intermediate lines of business even though these may

be important sources of corporate profits or losses [Singh and Chang (1992)]. Instead, all
secondary and intermediate activities of a firm that are primary activities at the establishment level
are reponed in TRINET.
We do not wish to imply that TRINET data give a better account of corporate diversity in all
respects; these data have several problems of their own. The most important of these is that
TRINET covers only U.S. establishments which may cause underreporting of diversity for firms
with large overseas operations. In addition, data on establishment-level sales are not always
directly measurable (for example, an establishment may make only intrafirm sales). In this case,

9 FASB 14 reads "detennination of an enterprise's industry segments must depend to a considerable extent on the
judgement of the management of the enterprise...."
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TRINET uses data on industry labor productivity to infer establishment-level sales. This means
that individual establishment-level sales data are less reliable than employee data in the 1RINET
database. We therefore use employee-weighted measures of diversification in our analyses.

3.3

Measurement issues
Definitions of financial variables used in our regressions are given in Appendix A. The

measures of fmn focus used in our analysis are defined as follows:
(i) Specialization ratio. The specialization ratio (also called the "maximum proportion") is

defined as the number of employees in a firm's largest 4-d.igit SIC industry divided by its total
employees. The specialization ratio therefore measures the degree to which a firm's business
portfolio is dominated by a single "core" line of business. Managers of highly specialized fmns
may have detailed knowledge about products and customers since they oversee fewer lines of
business.

(ii) Relatedness ratio. The relatedness ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of employees
in a fum's largest 2-digit SIC industry sector to its total number of employees. If the relatedness
ratio is high most lines of business lie within one industrial sector, increasing the potential for
earning economies of scope [Rumelt (1986)]. On the other hand, if the relatedness ratio is low, the

firm will be diversified into more "unrelated" business sectors, reducing the potential for exploiting
economies of scope. Several studies have associated measures of relatedness and firm
performance.lO

(iii) 4-digit Span. 4-digit Span is the number of 4-digit SIC codes in which the firm owns
establishments. As 4-digit span increases, the level of knowledge at the corporate headquarters
where capital allocation decisions are made about each individual line of business may decline, so
that firms with greater span may be.less efficiently managed. Firms with many lines of business

10 Rumelt (1986) and Palepu (1985) show that the accounting returns of related-diversified
firms are higher than those of unrelated-diversified firms. Similarly, Wernerfelt and
Montgomery (1988) show that related-diversified firms have higher Tobin's q. In contrast,
Lang and Stulz (1992) show that diversified firms have lower q's.
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may have invested excessively in "exploratory" diversification at the expense of building core
competitive capability [Singh and Chang (1992)].11

(iv) 2-digit Span. 2-digit span measures the number of 2-digit industries the firm participates
in. If a firm participates in many 2-digit industries, its potential for exploiting economies of scope

will be lower.12

4.

Trends in Firm Focus During the 1980s

4.1 Changes in the size and focus of large corporations
Table 1 shows changes taking place in the base sample consisting of all surving, entering and
exiting firms. The table shows that firms in this sample refocused in terms of both median
specialization and median relatedness in the 1980s. The specialization ratio of the median firms
increased by 10.6%. By 1989, 65.8% of the median firm's sales came from one 4-digit businesscompared with 59.6% in 1981. The relatedness ratio increased even more, by a median of 16.8%..
showing a significant decline in unrelated diversification. By 1989, 80.7% of the median firm's
sales were within one 2-digit industry. In contrast, the 4-digit span of the median firm increased
by 16.7%, although its 2-digit span was unchanged.
The results Table 1 are largely consistent with Jensen's (1991) ccintention that corporate
restructuring in the 1980s created a population of smaller, leaner and more often private firms. Not
only did the median firm refocus significantly, but median employment also dropped by 23.8%
(although sales increased by 14.2%). In addition, the proportion of private firms in the population
increased from 27.8% in 1981 to 39.2% in 1989.
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) describe the trend in corporate refocusing during the 1980s as
"deconglomerization". Our results support their description. The increases in specializ.ation and
relatedness show that firms became more centered on core businesses during the 1980s, indicating

11 Comment and Jarrell (1992) and Lichtenberg (1992) find that public finns on the average reduced their 4digit span during the 1980s.
12 Howevez. Matsusaka (1990) notes that this is not always the case: some combinations of 2-digit industries
offer economies of scope while others do not.
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a decline in conglomerate diversification strategies which are typified by a portfolio of large
businesses with no core. Our findings are also consistent with Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) who
find that firms divested in more unrelated than related lines of business during the 1980s.
Moreover, although we rmd that the median rmn added one 4-digit line of business, the fact that
specialization and relatedness also increased shows that this new line of business was related
Therefore, our results suggest that while rmns refocused in the 1980s, they also sought new
opportunities to exploit economies of scope.
A relevant question is whether the changes in focus among large rmns shown in Table 1 were
caused by changes in the population of large rmns, rather than by changes in the focus of

surviving flnns. An answer to this question is provided in Table 2. This table shows that 1,906
rmns which were in the top 2,500 rmns in 1981 were also in the top 2,500 firms in 1989, a
survival rate of 76%. However, there was a clear difference in focus between those firms which
exited our sample and those which entered The focus of the median exiting finn was no lower
than that of surviving firms (the specialization ratio was somewhat higher, while the relatedness
ratio was the same). In contras~ entering firms were far more focused than either exiting or
surviving firms. This panly reflects the smaller size of entrants because size and focus are
inversely related Indeed, Table 2 shows that exiting firms were similar to surviving firms in terms
of sales and employees in 1981, while entering firms bad less sales and fewer employees.
Table 2 shows that the proportion of exiting firms which were privately held corporations was
34.6%, while the proportion of entering firms which were private was half again as high (55.8% ).
Therefore, exit also played a role in increasing the importance of private firms in the population of
large firms observed in Table 1.
Despite the importance of exit in changing the focus of the population of large rmns during the
1980s, Table 2 shows that significant changes in focus took place among surviving firms.
Specialization in the median surviving finn increased 3.4% (compared with an increase of 10.6%
in the population) and relatedness increased 10.3% (compared with an increase of 16.8% in the
population). Both of these changes are statistically significant at the one percent level. Consistent
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with this trend, 4-digit span increased more in surviving flrms than in the overall population, by
33.3% (compared with an increase of 16.7% in the population). Therefore, focus on core
businesses increased less in surviving firms, and expansion at the margin increased more, than in
the overall population. These results show that the increased focus we flnd in Table 1 was not
solely due to the disappearance of flrms pursuing conglomerate diversification strategies.
In conclusion, the evidence presented in Table 2 shows that the pattern of deconglomerization
observed in Table 1 was caused by two factors: (a) the disappearance of diversified flrms from the
population which were usually replaced by smaller, more focused firms and (b) refocusing among
surviving firms. Interestingly, this evidence shows that deconglomerization in the population of
large firms was caused by more than the disappearance of conglomerates. Other forces were at
work pressuring surviving firms to refocus on core businesses. The rest of this paper is devoted
to examining the possible causes of this phenomenon.

4 2 Firm size and refocusing in surviving firms

One factor which may have caused refocusing in surviving firms during the 1980s is overexpansion. Large firms, with their giant bureaucracies, may be too large to diversify efficiently by
exploiting synergies while containing agency costs. We examine the relationship between firm size
and refocusing among surviving firms in Figure 1. This figure shows changes in specialization
and relatedness by size decile (the largest firms have the lowest decile number). Swprisingly, the
greatest increases in specialization and relatedness during the 1980s took place in relatively small
firms. Specialization among the largest 190 firms in the sample actually decreased.
One explanation for the tendency of the largest firms to diversify in the 1980s may be that they
were sheltered from market discipline by their sheer size. The costs of takeover or other
disciplinary mechanisms may have been too high to credibly threaten managers in very large firms
with replacement if they did not perform. However, the development of the junk bond changed
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this situation: the 1980s saw both abe largest buyouts and the largest takeovers ever undertaken. 13
This suggests that factors other than agency costs should explain this trend of continued
diversification among large firms. One alternative explanation is that large firms are good
diversifiers. For example, large firms may have greater stocks of fum-specific capital and so be
able to generate greater economies of scope.
Table 3 gives a more detailed view of portfolio restructuring activity by size decile, in order to
account for the lower rates of refocusing among large firms. The first two columns of the table
show the rates at which firms added establishments to their related core businesses (measured as
the largest 2-digit SIC business of the firm) and to their unrelated periphery (non-core businesses).
The largest firms had the lowest core business addition rates and the highest peripheral business
addition rates. Differences in establishment addition rates between the largest and smallest firms
are substantial. The median rate of addition to related core businesses among the largest firms
(10.3%) is 38% lower than that among flim.S in the smallest size decile (16.7%). Similarly, the
rate of addition to peripheral businesses among the largest flim.S (43.8%) is 89% higher than
among the smallest firms (23.1%). Remarkably, the largest surviving firms almost doubled their
number of establishments in peripheral businesses during the 1980s. Table 3 also shows that
divestiture rates are generally lower than addition rates. Small firms divested more from core
businesses areas than did large firms but did not divest peripheral assets at a substantially different
rate. In all, the evidence presented in Table 3 suggests that the key factor underlying the
differential refocusing of small and large firms in the 1980s was the asset investment rate and not
the asset divestiture rate: larger firms invested more in peripheral businesses while small firms
invested more in core businesses.

l3 Such as the buyout of RJR-Nabisco, the takeovt"l' of General Foods by Philip Morris and the takeover of Getty
Oil by Texaco.
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43 Firm focus and refocusing in surviving firms
A second factor which may have caused refocusing in surviving firms during the 1980s is
over-diversification. Some firms may have become too diversified to efficiently exploit economies
of scope or information asymmetries, or to avoid agency costs, capital misallocation, and
misvaluation [Jensen (1986), Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Markides (1992)]. On the
other hand, widely diversified firms may own valuable assets which can be exploited in a variety
of markets. We investigate this issue in Figure 2 which shows changes in specialization and
relatedness between 1981 and 1989 by firm focus decile in 1981. The figure shows clearly that
firms which were highly diversified in 1981 refocused during the 1980s, while more focused firms
diversified, indicating an overall trend of mean reversion in diversification. Mean-reversion is
consistent with a number of explanations for refocusing. Highly diversified firms may have
refocused to reduce agency costs, to reduce the scope of internal capital markets, to concentrate on
horizontal expansion in core markets, or to overcome misvaluation.
Figure 3 investigates whether or not refocusing has reduced the overall importance of the
internal capital markets of highly diversified firms in the economy. The figure shows the
proportion of aggregate revenues of all surviving public firms in both 1981 and 1989 which was
earned by firms which had above median focus in 1981. According to·the internal capital market
inefficiency argument the aggregate revenue share of firms which were more diversified in 1981
should have decreased relative to the aggregate revenue share of more focused firms. The figure
shows that the aggregate revenue shares of more specialized fllllls did increase between 1981 and
1989, but only by 0.8%; the revenue shares of more related firms increased ·by 3%. Therefore, the
aggregate scope of the internal capital markets of more focused firms increased only very slightly
during the 1980s. In light of these results, it would be difficult to argue that refocusing can be
largely understood as the result of increased inefficiency of internal capital market allocation.
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4.4 Differences in refocusing in public and private finns
According to the agency theory explanation for corporate refocusing, managerial incentive
alignment with shareholders is weakest in public firms where managers typically own little equity
relative to private fmns. Consequently, private firms should have had lower levels of inefficient
diversification in 1981, giving them less reason to refocus. However, Table 4 shows that more
refocusing took place among private firms than among public firms during the 1980s.
Specialization increased by 10.2% in private firms and by only 0.4% in public firms; relatedness
also increased more in private firms. These results appear to be inconsistent with agency
arguments for refocusing. However, since private fli'IllS were smaller and more focused than
public firms in 1981, it is possible that other factors led private flfDls to refocus more during the
1980s. For example, private firms may have held weaker market positions than public fli'IllS in
1981, and so may have been forced to exit more markets. Consistent with agency theory
arguments, Table 4 shows that refocusing was higher in fli'IllS which changed from public to
private ownership than in firms which remained public.
With regard to changes in focus among surviving public firms, Table 4 shows that the
specialization ratio remained essentially unchanged, but that the relatedness ratio increased
significantly, by 7%. In contrast, 4-digit span increased by 25% in stlrViving public flfDlS between
1981 and 1989. This latter finding is inconsistent with the findings of Lichtenberg (1992) and
Comment and Jarrell (1991) who find that the 4-digit span of public firms declined during the
1980s. One potential explanation for this difference in results is that both Lichtenberg and
Comment and Jarrell use the COMPUSTAT industry segment data to measure span, which is
collected at a higher level of aggregation than the TRINET data, and so ignores smaller lines of
business. In fact, we see no increase in span at the 2-digit SIC level. Some of the previously
discussed differences between the COMPUSTAT and Trinet databases may explain the difference
in results.
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S The Determinants of Change in Corporate Focus
Regressions analyzing the determinants of change in corporate focus during the 1980s are
shown in Tables 5 and 6. The sample of 1,215 fl.IlllS analyzed in these regression represents all
surviving public fums from the largest 2,500 firms in 1981.14 Entering and exiting flrms are
excluded as are private fums and firms which changed their corporate status from private to public
or vice-versa between 1981 and 1989. The explanatory variables in the regressions are intended to
test each of the four explanations for corporate refocusing which are discussed in detail in Section
2.1. However, some caution is advised in interpreting these analyses: Since we lack a fully
specified model of the causes of corporate diversification [Rumelt (1986)], the results can only be
interpreted as part of a more comprehensive but unspecified causal model of the determinants of
refocusing.
Three models are presented for each of the four dependent variables considered below. To
control for possible non-linearity in the relationships between independent and dependent
variables, we use reduced rank regressions in the analyses [lman and Conover (1979)). This
technique uses the ranks of dependent and all ordinal independent variables in an OLS regression.
An important advantage of this regression method is that it is robust in the presence of the large

outliers which naturally arise when measuring the percentage change in focus over a decade.15

5.1 The determinants of increases in specialization and relatedness
Table 5 shows the six regressions analyzing the determinants of increases in specialization and
relatedness. The level of fum focus in 1981 is entered in all equations as a control variable since
all explanations for refocusing in the 1980s which we test are conditioned on the prior extent of

corporate diversiflcation. This coefficient of this variable is negative and significant in all the
regressions, showing a trend of mean-reversion of diversification, consistent with the prior
univariate analysis. Gort, Grabowski and McGuckin (1985) also find a trend in mean reversion in

14 With the exception of 20 public finns listed in TRINET for which COMPUSTAT data wm: not available.
15 The distribution of measures of growth in focus are skewed and highly leptokurtotic.
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diversification in their sample of 191 firms examined in the 1967-71 period, showing that meanreversion in diversification was not confined to the 1980s.
The agency explanation foe COipOnlte refocusing is tested using Tobin's q in 1981: firms with
low Tobin's q are expected to refocus more than other firms. To our surprise, the regressions
show no significant relationship between Tobin's q in 1981 and subsequent corporate
refocusing.t6 This casts doubt on the argument that refocusing took place to reduce agency
costs.1 7
The internal capital market inefficiency explanation for refocusing is tested by relating the
book value of a firm's assets in 1981 to subsequent refocusing using the logic that firms with high
historical investment rates are more vulnerable to problems of capital misallocation [Bhide (1990)].
The regressions show a significant and economically important negative relationship between asset
size in 1981 and refocusing; large firms were less likely to refocus than smaller firms. This is
consistent with the prior univariate analysis of the relationship between firm size and refocusing
reported in Figure 1. The finding is inconsistent with the internal capital market inefficiency
explanation for refocusing.
The antitrust argument for corporate refocusing is tested using core business market share in
1981 as a proxy for the potential gains available to firms from the relaxation in enforcement of antitrust legislation during the 1980s. The regression results show a significant negative relationship
between core business market share in 1981 and subsequent refocusing-a result inconsistent with
the argument that firms previously constrained from horizontal market expansion in their core
business focused most in the 1980s. To the contrary, firms with large market shares were less
likely to refocus during the 1980s than firms with smaller shares. One explanation may be that the

firms with higher core market shares had such a high share that even the relaxation of antitrust
regulation would not enable them to expand these businesses any further. We examine this

16 In an unreponed regression we also find that anothez measure ofpezfoonance, profitability in 1981, does
not predict the extent of refocusing in lbe 1980s.
17 Intemctions of q with cash flow and pi<r divezsificatioo as in Lang, Stolz and Walkling (1991) and
Opler and Tiunan (1992) were also not statistically significant in unreported regressions.
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possibility in the Model ll regressions which include a dummy variable for those firms with the
highest quartile core business market shares in 1981. This variable is not important in either
regression. Overall, these results suggest that firms with high core market shares in 1981
possessed valuable assets that they exploited by increased diversification, and not by refocusing
through core market expansion. Moreover, the results suggest that firms with smaller market
shares retrenched by refocusing, rather than escaping from undesirable core market positions
through diversification. This implies that firms which failed to build assets which conferred them a
competitive advantage in their core markets were most under pressure to refocus in the 1980s.
The misvaluation explanation for refocusing is tested using the variance of analysts'
earnings forecasts in 1981. The results for this variable are reported separately in regression
Model m, since data for this variable were available for only 771 of the total sample of 1,215
firms. The results show that this variable is not significantly correlated with increases in
specialization, and is negatively correlated with increases in relatedness.
We test the economies of scope explanation for diversification using the ratio of R&D
expenditures to total sales in 1981 as a proxy for the level of firm-specific assets. R&D
expenditures are significantly negatively correlated with increases in focus in all the
·.
regressions. This result is consistent with our earlier conjecture that fmns with valuable
idiosyncratic assets were not subjected to pressures to refocus in the 1980s. It is also
consistent with the prior findings ofGort (1962) that diversification is concentrated in
technology-intensive industries.

52 The deteT"/1Unants of increases in span
Table 6 repeats the analyses presented in Table 5 using growth in 4-digit and 2-digit span
as dependent variables. Recall that increases in firm span represent increases in diversification,
not increases in focus. The evidence we presented in Section 4 showed that 4-digit span
increased among sample firms in the 1980s. Table 6 shows that lack of agency costs was a
factor in this expansion. Tobin's q is positively correlated with increases in span, indicating
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that firms which had low agency costs in 1981 entered more new businesses during the 1980s.
Because change in span is highly correlated with asset growth, this coefficient may also reflect
the market's ability to anticipate future growth of high q fums. Consistent with the results
presented in Table 5, the regressions in also show that larger firms also increased their span
more in the 1980s, as did more focused firms. Finally, the regressions in Table 6 show that
firms with higher core market shares in 1981 diversified more than other firms, also consistent
with the findings presented in Table 5.

6

Conclusions
This paper has studied the extent of change in corporate focus in the 1980s among the

largest firms in the U.S. economy and has examined some of its possible causes. The median
surviving fmn in our sample refocused by becoming more specialized and more related in the
1980s. However, at the same time, involvement in related lines of business increased,
suggesting that fmns continued to search for economies of scope in the 1980s.
The results of this study give little suppon to any of the four explanations for refocusing
investigated. In a test of the agency explanation for corporate refocusing, we find that Tobin's

q was not a determinant of refocusing during the 1980s. We also fmd that refocusing was
more extensive among private firms than public firms, suggesting weak managerial incentives
in public fmns were not a predominant cause of subsequent pressures to refocus. This finding

is also inconsistent with the story that equity market misvaluation led firms to focus. Other
tests cast considerable doubt on the misvaluation, antitrust and internal capital market
inefficiency explanations for corporate refocusing.
Overall, the results of this study suggest that changes in corporate focus among surviving

firms were a response to changes in the competitive environmenL First, we find that the largest
firms in the economy diversified during the 1980s, while smaller firms refocused. This suggests
that large firms benefitted from economies of scope (such as cost advantages in joint production)
not available to smaller firms. Such advantages may have become an important condition for
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successful diversification in the 1980s as global competition intensified. Second, we find that
firms with high levels of investment in R&D diversified during the 1980s. This is consistent with
arguments that R&D investments are an importnat source of competitive advantage--especially in
global markets [Kravis and Lipsey (1992)]. Finally, we find that firms with higher core market
shares diversified during the 1980s. High core market share may indicate that firms possess cost
or product advantages not available to rivals which can then be transferred to other markets. Once
again, these advantages may have become a condition for competing successfully in an
increasingly global and technologically advanced marketplace. For smaller firms with low core
market shares and low levels of R&D investment, our evidence tells a different story. These fums
retrenched during the 1980s by refocusing, divesting assets from both periperal and core
businesses. Their refocusing appears to have been a permanent response to their reduced
competitive strength in an economy increasingly dominated by large, successful and innovative
firms.
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Appendix A.
Research and development (R&D) expense, book value of assets, market value of equity,
debt, and revenues data were obtained from the Industrial COMPUSTAT II tapes. Tobin's q
was defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm's equity plus the.book value of its total
debt Oong and shon term) to the book value of its total assets, following Wiles (1990).
Data on diversification, specialization, relatedness, asset addition and divestiture rates and the
number of establishments per firm were computed using the 1981 and 1989 TRINET Inc.'s Large

Establishment Data Base research tapes issued in these years. The specialization ratio was computed
by dividing the number of employees in the firm's largest 4-digit SIC code (that is, the 4-digit SIC
code with the largest number of employees for that firm), by the number of employees for all firms
in that 4-digit SIC code. The relatedness ratio was estimated using the same procedure at the 2-digit
SIC code level. Establishment drop or divestiture rates were computed as the sum of employees in all
establishments listed as being owned by a firm in 1981 which it was not listed as owning in 1989,
divided by the total number of employees of that firm in 1981. Conversely. plant addition or
acquisition rates were computed as the sum of employees in all establishments listed as being owned
by a firm in 1989 which it was not listed as owning in 1981, divided by the total number of
employees of that firm in 1989. Analysts' disagreement was computed as the five year mean of the
monthly coefficient of variation of analysts' forecasts for earnings one year in advance.

Table 1
Median levels of firm focus, firm size and fraction of private firms in a sample of 3,609 firms
which includes the largest 2500 employers in 1981 and 1989. Sales are denominated in
millions of 1981 dollars. Change from 1981 to 1989 is measured as the percentage change in
the medians. Statistical significance of changes is measured using a one-tailed Wilcoxon
signed rank test.

1989

Change from
1981 to 1989

2,787

2,719

NA

$296.7

$338.9

14.2%a

3,227

2,460

-23.8%a

Specialization Ratio

59.6%

65.8%

10.6%a

Relatedness Ratio

69.1%

80.7%

16.8o/oa

Variable
Number of firms
Sales
Employees

1981

Span (4-digit level)

6

7

16.7%

Span (2-digit level)

3

3

0.0%

Percent Private

27.8%

•statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level.

39.2%

41.0%a

Table 2
Median levels of focus and size and the percent of private finns among the subsamp1e of survivor
fim1s, entering finns and exiting finns in the 1981-89 period. Sales are denominated in millions of
1981 dollars. Change from 1981 to 1989 is measured as the percentage change in the medians.
Statistical significance of changes is measured using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test.

Variable

Year

Sample Size
Sales

1981
1989
Change an10ng survivors
Difference relative to survivors

Employees

1981
1989
Change among survivors
Difference relative to survivors

Specialization Ratio

1981
1989
Change among survivors
Difference relative to survivors

Relatedness Ratio

1981
1989
Change among survivors
Difference relative to survivors

Span (4-digit)

1981
1989
Change an10ng survivors
Difference relative to survivors

Span (2-digit)

1981
1989
Change an10ng survivors
Difference relative to survivors

Percent Private

1981
1989
Change among survivors
Difference relative to survivors

•statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level.

Survivor
Fim1
Sample

Entering
Finn
Sample

Exiting
Firm
Sample

1,906

814

882

$301.1
$414.2
. 37.6%"

$288.1
$256.2
-38 .1%"

3.458
2,995
-13.4o/c/

2,828
1,500
-49.9%"

58.4%
60.4%
3.4"

82.4%

69.1%

4
-16.7%.
3
2
-33.3%"

24.6%
32.2%
30.9%"

0.0%
5

-50.0%8
3
3
0.0%

5.7%"

91. 7o/o.
20.3%"

6
8
33.3%"

-18.2%"
61.7%

36.4%"
69.1%
76.2%
10.3%"

-4.3%

0.0%
34.6%

55.8%
73 .3%8

40.7%.

Table 3
The median rates of core and periphery establishment addition and divestiture among 1,906
surviving members of the cohort of the 2,500 largest finns in 1981 by size decile. The
largest fi.rms in 1981 have the lowest decile number. The core addition (divestiture) rate is
the number of establishments added (dropped) to the firm's largest 2-digit SIC industry
divided by the total number of establishments in 1981. The periphery addition rate is the
number of establishments added outside of the firm's largest 2-digit SIC industry divided by
the total number of establishments in 1981.

Size
Decile
1
2

3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10

Periphery
Addition
Rate(%)

Core
Addition
Rate (%)

Periphery
Divestiture
Rate(%)

43 .8
35.4
28.1
20.8
23.0
17.1
17.6
20.4
20.7
23.1

10.3
11.9
19.0
16.7
14.3
18.5
18.6
16.7
17.4
16.7

15.6
15.6
18.7
15.9
17.9
23.0
17.4
20.9
25.5
16.6

Core
Divestiture
Rate(%)
4.0
4.4
6.3
6.6
8.3
10.0
8.5
8.5
10.1
7.8

Table 4
Median levels of focus and size between groups which stayed public, stayed private and changed from public to private and viceversa in the 1981-89 period.

Median
Median
Median Specialization
Sales
(Millions) Employees
Ratio

Median
Relatedness
Ratio

Median
Span
(4-digit)

Median
Span
(2-digit)

Stayed public (N=1,235)
1981
1989
Growth

$375
$579
54.4%"

4,433
4,146
-6.5%

54.9%
55.1%
0.4%

67.6%
72.4%
7.1%"

8
10
25.0% 1

3
3
0.0%

Stayed private (N=411)
1981
1989
Growth

$184
$213
15.8%b

1,763
1,635
-7.3%

65.6%
72.3%
10.2%"

76.3%
85.2%
11.7%"

4
5
25 .0% 1

2
2
0.0%

Public to private (N=202)
1981
1989
Growth

$297
$296
-0.3%

3,981
2,712
-31.9% 3

55.9%
61.2%
9.5%"

65.2%
73.2%
12.3%"

8
7
-12.5%

3
3
0.0%

Private to public (N=57)
1981
1989
Growth

$241
$384
59.3% 3

1,942
2,340
20.5%

83.8%
79.1%
-5.6%

84.7%
84.8%
0.1%

4
6
50.0% 3

2
2
0.0%

•statisticaJJy significant at the 1 percent level.
bStatisticaJJy significant at the 5 percent leveL

Table 5
Reduced rank regressions showing the dctenninants of growth in the specialization and relatedness
ratios among 1215 surviving publicly traded finns between 1981 and 1989. Coefficients are
elasticities showing percentage impact of a unitary shift in an independent variable on the dependent
variable. t-statistics are given in parentheses.

Specialization Ratio
I

II

Relatedness Ratio
III

II

III

Tobin's q in 1981

-0.016
(0.55)

-0.017
(0.58)

-0.015
(0.37)

-7.3E-4
(0.03)

0.0013
(0.05)

-0.044
(1.10)

Specialization/relatedness in
in 1981

-0.44
(16 .1)"

-0.44
( 16.1 )"

-0.41
(11.5)"

-0.45
(17.0)"

-0.45
(17.0)3

-0.44
(12.9) 3

Total book value of assets
in 1981

-0.10
(3.7 3 )''

-0.10
(3 .73)"

-0.10
(2.34)h

-0.076
(2.75)"

-0.076
(2.74)3

-0.15
(3.46)"

Core market share in 1981

-0. 10
(3.75 )"

-0.09

-0.12
(3.29)"

-0.083
(2.99)"

-0. 11
(2.63)"

-0.06
( l. 70)c

Upper quartile market share
in 1981

(2 . 30)~

-10.6
(0.34)

Variability in analysts'
earnings forecasts in 1981

25.6
(0.81)
-0.013
(0.24)

-0.12
(2.14)b

R&D expenses/sales in 1981

-0.087
(2.75)"

-0.087
(2.75)3

-0.081
(2.05)h

-0.14
(4.49)"

-0.14
(4.50) 3

-0.13
(3.54)3

Intercept

1066
(27 .5)"

1063
(26.8)"

1055
(15.4)"

1064
(28.9)"

1070
(28 .3)"

1161
(17.9t

1215
0. 19

1215
0.19

771
0.17

1215
0.21

·1215
0.21

771
0.20

Sample size
Adjusted R2

•statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level.
.:Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 6
Reduced rank regressions showing the detenninants of growth in span among 1215 surviving publicly
traded finns between 1981 and 1989. Cocfllcicnts arc elasticities showing percentage impact of a
unitary shift in an independent variable on the dependent variable. t-statistics are given in parentheses.

4-digit span
II

2-digit span
III

I

II

III

Tobin's q in 1981

0.17
(5.83)"

0.17
(5.79)"

0.19
(4.47)"

0.047
(1.64)'

0.042
(1.47)

0.085
(2.10)b

Span in 1981

-0.29
(9.62)'

-0.29
(9.61 )"

-0.21
(5.42)"

-0.39
(13.9)"

-0.39
(13 .9)8

-0.40
(11.4)"

Total book value of assets
in 1981

0.23
(7.76)"

0.23
(7.75)"

0.23
(4.99)"

0.18
(6.49)"

0.18
(6.46)"

0.24
(5.57)8

Core market share in 1981

0.18
(6.06)"

0.18
(4.23)"

0.18
(4.73)"

0.09
(3.22)"

0.14
(3.48)"

0.057
(1.56)"

Upper quartile market share
in 1981

-5.02
(0.15)

Variability of analysts'
earnings forecasts in 1981

-55.8
(1.76)'
-0.044
(0.79)

0.039
(0.70)

R&D expense/sales in 1981

0.052
(1.55)

0.052
( 1.55)

0.037
(0.90)

0.10 .
(3.10)" .

0.10
(3.10)"

0.14
(3.61)8

Intercept

401
(12.6)"

400
(12.1 )"

352
(5.85)"

591
(18 .3)"

575
(17.2?

505
(8.62)'

1215
0.13

1215
0.13

771
0.10

Sample size
Adjusted R 2

•statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level.
cstatistically significant at the 10 percent.Jevel.

1215
0.18

1215
0.18

771
0.18

Growth rate In focus, 1981-89
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Fig. 1. Change in specialization and relatedness by 1981 size decile.
The figure shows percentage changes in the specialization ratio and the relatedness ratio
between 1981 and 1989 among 1,906 surviving members of the cohort ·of the 2,500 largest
fmns in 1981. The largest firms in 1981 have the lowest decile number. Each decile
represents 190 firms.
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Fig. 2. Change in focus by 1981 focus decile.
The figure shows changes in specialization and relatedness among 1,906 surviving members
of the cohort of the 2,500 largest firms in 1981. The firms with the highest specialization
ratio in 1981 have the lowest decile number.
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Relatedness

Measure of focus
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Fig. 3. Change in aggregate scope of internal capital markets.
The figure shows the share of aggregate revenues of all surviving firm$ with above median
focus in 1981 and 1989. These firms had a related ratio greater than 69.1% (the 1981 median
value).
In 1981 952 fmns had a relatedness ratio more than the median of 69.1% with total sales
revenues of $1.21 trillion. There were 953 firms with a relatedness ratio less than 69.1%
with sales revenues of $1.55 trillion. By 1989, 811 fmns had a relatedness ratio less than
69.1% with total revenues of $1.68 trillion, and 1,094 fmns had a relatedness ratio greater
than 69.1% with total revenues of $1.12 trillion. Sales revenues are denominated in 1981
dollars.
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